Abstracts

João Lemos

"Propaganda as a Loathsome Art. A Kant-Inspired Account of Propaganda"

In an often neglected section of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (§53) Kant criticizes rhetoric, as the art of the orator, for being “a deceitful art, which understands how to move people, like machines, to a judgment in important matters which must lose all weight for them in calm reflection” (CPJ, 5: 328n). Such criticism might have some important implications that Kant does not explicitly considers. First, the art of the orator might not be a beautiful art. Although Kant includes it in his experiment of comparing the aesthetic value of the beautiful arts with each other, it seems that the products of the art of the orator attempt at leaving no room for a crucial feature of Kant’s conception of a judgment of taste, namely the freedom of the imagination. If this is so, then such products cannot be beautiful, for one cannot take a disinterested pleasure in them. The second implication concerns our response to the products of the art of the orator. This is the crucial focus of my paper. I claim that the proper response to rhetorical speeches is a ‘strange sensation’ that Kant mentions only once in his third Critique, namely Ekel (loathing, disgust) (CPJ, 5: 312). I start by spelling out Kant’s sole reference to loathing/disgust in the third Critique, in §48, and by presenting the art of the orator as a loathsome/disgusting art: rhetorical speeches make use of deceit (beautiful illusion, artful trickery) in order to impose the enjoyment. I go on to argue that, although Kant suggests that it is impossible for rhetorical speeches to be taken as beautiful, resisting or not resisting to aesthetically appreciating them is ultimately up to one: one might notice that a speaker is trying to rob one of one’s freedom, and still one may accept being engaged. I conclude by arguing that rather than being precluded from aesthetically appreciating rhetorical speeches, it is the case that we ought to preclude ourselves from doing so. Some difficulties arise once one considers propaganda as a paradigm case of the art of the orator, and therefore as a loathsome/disgusting art. Why is it so? Is deceit (beautiful illusion, artful trickery) an exclusive feature of propaganda? Is loathsomeness a feature of propaganda only? Why do the products of propaganda arouse such a strange sensation (Ekel, loathing, disgust) whereas other products do not – or why do the former arouse it in a way that the latter do not? Should an embellished, persuasive conference paper supporting Kant’s categorical imperative arouse Ekel? In my Kant-inspired paper, I hold that there is a feature of propaganda that makes it particularly loathsome/disgusting, namely proactive impertinence: not only does propaganda aim at persuading one by means of deceit (beautiful illusion, artful trickery); it takes the initiative of chasing one until one is persuaded. Since this means that propaganda does its best in order to rob one of one’s freedom, one ought to be loath to aesthetically appreciate it, one ought to be disgusted at it, one ought to feel Ekel.